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Abstract In countries with a public long-term care (LTC) insurance scheme administered
by multiple non-competing insurers, these insurers typically lack incentives for purchasing
cost-effective LTC because they are not at risk for LTC expenses. Plans to introduce these
incentives by allowing competition among risk bearing LTC insurers are likely to jeopardize
universal access. Combining universal access and competition among risk bearing LTC-
insurers requires an adequate system of risk adjustment. While risk adjustment is now widely
adopted in health insurance, LTC-specific features cause uncertainty about the feasibility of
risk adjustment for LTC insurance. We examine the feasibility of appropriate risk adjustment
in LTC insurance by using a rich set of linked nationwide Dutch administrative data. As
expected, prior LTC use and demographic information are found to explain much of the
variation in individual LTC expenses. However, we find that prior health care expenditures are
also important in reducing predicted losses for subgroups of health care users. Nevertheless,
incentives for risk selection against some easily identifiable subgroups persist. Moreover,
using prior utilization and expenditure as risk adjusters reduces incentives for efficiency,
creating a trade-off between equity and efficiency. To ease this trade-off, data on individuals’
underlying needs for LTC are required.
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Introduction
Worldwide, health policy makers are confronted with ageing populations and rising demand
for long-term care1 (LTC) and are looking for ways to guarantee access to LTC services in
a sustainable way. Barr (2010) argues that there is a strong case for public provision of LTC
insurance. Indeed, virtually all OECD countries have at least some publicly provided manda-
tory coverage against LTC expenditures. Several of these countries have integrated some
“medical” LTC services in their public health insurance schemes, e.g. Belgium, Switzerland
and the US Medicare and Medicaid programs. Other countries have a separate public LTC
insurance scheme, e.g. the Netherlands (since 1968), Germany (since 1995), Japan (since
2000) and South-Korea (since 2002).
Typically, public LTC insurance is provided by public non-competing insurers who are not
at risk for the LTC expenses of their enrollees (Costa-Font and Courbage 2012). For instance,
in the Netherlands LTC insurance is administered by about 30 regional insurers that are fully
reimbursed for the LTC expenses of their clients that are covered by the public scheme. As
a consequence, these public insurers have no incentives to secure that high-quality LTC ser-
vices are provided at low cost. To control expenditures in public LTC insurance, governments
have traditionally relied on demand rationing (e.g. means testing, copayments and cover-
age restrictions), and supply rationing (e.g. price regulation, provider budgets, and capacity
restrictions) (Costa-Font and Courbage 2012). Both types of rationing, however, have impor-
tant drawbacks, which are likely to be exacerbated by the expected increase in demand for
LTC. Demand-side rationing may result in access problems for low-income individuals who
need LTC; supply-side rationing may result in waiting lists and substandard quality of care.
In several countries, another way to encourage efficient use of LTC has been introduced or
proposed: to provide LTC insurers with incentives to contract efficient LTC providers. This
could be achieved by putting LTC insurers at risk for providing LTC coverage and allowing
them to compete for customers. However, competition among risk-bearing insurers is likely to
jeopardize universal access because LTC expenses are typically high and correlated over time
(Van Barneveld et al. 1997) and consequently actuarially fair premiums will be unaffordable
to many people needing LTC.
To combine competition with universal access in social health insurance markets, several
countries have introduced a system of managed competition in which insurers cannot reject
applicants and are required to charge community-rated premiums to all applicants. To guar-
antee affordable access to coverage, insurers receive risk-adjusted premium subsidies2 that
eliminate or at least reduce incentives to increase profits through risk selection3. These sub-
1 Definitions of LTC vary internationally. In this paper we focus on elderly care, which in the Netherlands (and
elsewhere) accounts for the majority of total LTC expenditure covered by LTC insurance (CVZ 2011). Elderly
care is defined as home care, social assistance, assistance with activities of daily living and inpatient stays in
either a residential home or a nursing home. This definition comprises both “medical” and “non-medical” LTC:
unlike in some other European countries, in the Netherlands there is no sharp distinction between medical and
non-medical LTC.
2 See Van de Ven and Schut (2011) for a description of how these subsidies are organized and for a full
overview of strategies that are used to ensure affordable access to coverage.
3 Insurers may engage in risk selection by differentiating their benefit packages or, if the benefit package is
fixed, the level of service or the quality of the contracted provider network that they offer to each type of
patient (Cao and McGuire 2003). Thus, an insurer may discourage individuals who need or desire a particular
service to join its plan by limiting access or by contracting unattractive providers. Risk selection is undesirable
because it may lead to welfare losses if (i) resources are employed for risk selection rather than for improving
care; (ii) inefficient health plans that are successful in risk selection survive; and/or (iii) good quality LTC is
underprovided (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000).
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sidies reduce differences in expected costs between individuals and thus make all applicants
equally attractive for an insurer (Enthoven 1988; Van de Ven and Ellis 2000).
Managed competition has been proposed and implemented to ensure equitable access
to public LTC insurance (Medicaid) in the US and increase its efficiency (Lucas 1996). In
Switzerland and Belgium, medical LTC is integrated in social health insurance coverage that
is offered by risk-bearing competing health insurers, although the financial risk for Belgian
insurers is quite limited (OECD 2011; Schokkaert and van de Voorde 2011; Weaver 2012;
Willeme et al. 2012). Recently, the Dutch government launched a similar proposal. According
to this proposal, managed competition will be introduced for home care in 2015 and after
2 years insurers should bear the full risk for covering home health benefits. To this end,
coverage for home care is included in the social health insurance benefit package. Managed
competition may also be introduced for nursing home care after 2017 (Rijksoverheid 2013).
An appropriate system of risk-adjusted premium subsidies is crucial to safeguarding uni-
versal access in a competitive LTC insurance market. However, whereas risk adjustment in
health insurance has been studied extensively, empirical research on risk adjustment in LTC
insurance is nearly nonexistent. The aim of this paper is to examine how and to what extent
a system of risk adjusted subsidies can reduce the financial incentives for risk selection in
LTC insurance within the context of managed competition. To this end, the following five
questions are addressed: (1) How do LTC expenditures differ from expenditures on medical
care and how do these differences affect the options to use risk adjustment to reduce risk
selection? (2) What are the predicted losses and gains on LTC for insurers in case of annual
contracts, community rating and no risk adjustment? (3) To what extent are the predicted
losses and gains reduced by the most comprehensive risk-adjustment model based on data
on: (i) demographic characteristics, (ii) prior LTC use and (iii) prior health care expenditures
(HCE) and inpatient hospital diagnoses? (4) What is the contribution of each of these sets of
risk adjusters to the reduction of the predicted losses and gains in the most comprehensive
risk-adjustment model? (5) How are the predicted losses and gains affected when the risk
adjusters that provide substantial perverse incentives to insurers are removed from the risk
adjustment model?
What is already known about risk adjustment in long-term care?
The experience with risk adjustment in health insurance cannot be readily used to develop an
appropriate risk adjustment system for LTC insurance. LTC expenditures differ from health
care expenditures (HCE) in at least two important aspects (Van de Ven 2005). First, LTC
expenditures are concentrated among a limited group of beneficiaries, and are, conditional
upon use, high and stable over time. Consequently, in the absence of risk adjustment, risk
selection based on prior expenditures is much easier in LTC insurance than in health insur-
ance. Second, the availability of informal care is expected to have a much larger impact on
LTC expenditures than on HCE. But there is little experience with including informal care
availability in risk adjustment and the availability of informal care is difficult to quantify with
administrative data. Hence, differences in informal care availability cannot be fully captured
by the risk adjustment formula.
Little is known about how these issues can be dealt with and about how to design appro-
priate risk adjustment for LTC insurance. To date, there is only one study about the feasi-
bility of risk adjustment in Dutch LTC insurance (Van Barneveld et al. 1997). With prior
LTC expenditure as a risk adjuster and using data from one sickness fund, Van Barneveld
et al. (1997) examine the remaining potential for risk selection in the Dutch public LTC
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insurance scheme. They find an R2-statistic of 0.90, which indicates that LTC expenditures
are highly predictable at the individual level when information on prior expenditures is
available.
Using prior expenditures as a risk adjuster means that the insurer will be partly or fully
compensated for higher expenditures through higher future risk-adjusted capitation pay-
ments. This compensation may give insurers incentives for overprovision. Hence, compared
to the situation of capitation payments that are not based on prior expenditures, insurers face
fewer incentives for an efficient provision and allocation of LTC. Marchand et al. (2003) show
that despite this drawback, if insurers compete on quality, they receive stronger incentives to
be efficient when risk adjustment is based on prior expenditures or prior use than when they
are fully reimbursed for all expenditures.
Several studies on risk adjustment in US Medicare and Medicaid have tackled similar
issues. While the Medicare benefit package does not include LTC, the target population of
Medicare is similar and studies on risk adjustment in Medicare therefore provide a number of
relevant insights. First, risk adjustment for Medicare Advantage plans and for the Medicaid
Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) takes into account frailty as mea-
sured by the number of activities of daily living (ADL) problems; a risk adjustment model
without frailty was found to systematically underestimate expenditures for the frail elderly
and might therefore induce risk selection against this group (Kautter et al. 2009). Second,
the relationship between health care use in the past, demographic characteristics and future
health expenditures changes upon institutionalization and it is different for those who became
eligible for Medicare by reaching the age of 65 and those who became eligible because they
were disabled (Pope et al. 2004). This finding implies that risk adjusters should be interacted
with institutionalization and age. Third, incentives for risk selection persist despite exten-
sive risk adjustment: while risk selection on expected costs decreased after expanding the
risk adjustment formula beyond age and gender, insurers now select profitable enrollees by
focusing on characteristics not included in the model. Consequently, the Medicare program
has become more expensive spending on those in good health increases vis-à-vis spending
on those in bad health (Brown et al. 2011).
Outside the US, experience with risk adjustment in LTC insurance is limited to Switzer-
land and Belgium. In these countries, medical LTC is included in social health insurance.
In Switzerland, the risk adjustment formula comprises age, gender and a dummy variable
accounting for a recent stay of at least three days in a hospital or a LTC facility (Von
Wyl 2014). This dummy variable is likely to pick up some of the variation in expected
LTC expenditures. The Belgian risk adjustment formula includes more LTC-specific risk
adjusters. The capitation payment is adjusted for receipt of certain allowances (e.g. for
handicapped or because of a need for assistance) or nursing care at home during 3 months
(category B or C on the Katz-scale (Katz and Akpom 1976)). In addition, the risk adjust-
ment formula includes a number of indicators related to LTC use, e.g. living alone, being
widow/widower, physiotherapy for a severe illness, and Parkinson’s disease (Schokkaert
and van de Voorde 2011). While the Belgian risk adjustment formula is more sophisti-
cated than the one used in Switzerland, the financial risk is much more limited for Bel-
gian than for Swiss health insurers (Schokkaert and van de Voorde 2011; Paolucci et al.
2007). Therefore, risk selection against LTC patients appears to be financially attractive
in Switzerland but not in Belgium. It is, however, unclear whether the more sophisticated
Belgian model would suffice to prevent risk selection if financial risk for insurers were
expanded.
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Data and methods
Data
We use information from five nationwide administrative registries and one survey which are
all linked by Statistics Netherlands at the individual level4 . The administrative data would
be readily available if risk adjustment were implemented and include (1) health care expen-
ditures in 2000–2004 from the health insurance data collected by Vektis; (2) use of LTC in
2004 and 2005, which includes home care, social assistance, assistance with activities of daily
living and inpatient stays in either a residential home or a nursing home and which comes
from the Central Administration Office of the LTC insurance scheme (CAK); (3) hospital
admissions in 2002, 2003 and 2004 from the hospital discharge register (LMR); (4) demo-
graphic information for 2004 from the municipal register (GBA) and (5) mortality from the
cause-of-death registry (CBS). In addition, the General Survey of Living Conditions (POLS)
held in 2004 provides details on health, disability, and other individual characteristics for a
randomly drawn, representative sample of the non-institutionalized population. Prior health
care expenditures are registered for sickness fund enrollees only (two-thirds of the popula-
tion)5 and LTC use is registered for adults only (≥18 years of age); the other administrative
data sets comprise the entire Dutch population.
The sample was further reduced for two reasons. First, the records for one third of those
eligible for sickness fund coverage cannot not be linked. Second, 1.7 % of the sample was
excluded because of item non-response which always was the result of missing co-residence
status. As a result, the final sample consists of individuals who were insured through a sickness
fund, did not die in 2004 and whose records could be linked to the municipality register. The
total study population was 5,719,934, which is 45 % of the Dutch adult population in 2004.
From this subset of the population, 7,790 individuals were included in the 2004 POLS survey;
3,619 of these respondents also completed the more specific health module.
Methods
A good risk adjustment system should reduce insurers’ incentives for risk selection while
maintaining their incentives for efficiency. Ideally, after risk adjustment there are no easily
identifiable subgroups for which insurers are undercompensated or overcompensated. In
addition to an accurate prediction of individual expenditures, good risk adjusters should
provide appropriate incentives and should be administratively feasible (Van de Ven and Ellis
2000). Partly following Beck et al. (2010) and Shen and Ellis (2002) among others, we
identify the extent to which a risk adjustment model can reduce incentives for risk selection
in three steps. First, we measure the insurers’ incentives to select against subgroups6 based
on individual characteristics in case of community-rated annual contracts but in the absence
of risk adjustment. To quantify the insurers’ incentives for risk selection, we calculate the
difference between the average actual expenditures by subgroup and the average expenditures
for the entire population in 2005. We consider the incentives for risk selection to be strong
when the number of users in the subgroup is substantial (>300), the predicted loss for a person
in this group—the difference between observed expenditures for this subgroup and average
4 See De Meijer et al. (2011) for a more detailed description of the data.
5 Until 2006 enrollment was mandatory for two thirds of the population with an income below a threshold;
the remainder of the population was not eligible for social health insurance and could buy private insurance.
By contrast, public LTC insurance was (and is) mandatory for the entire population.
6 The selection of subgroups is based on data availability.
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expenditures for the entire population—is large (>1,000 euro) and significantly (p < 0.05)
different from zero. When these criteria are met, the benefits of risk selection are likely to
exceed the costs and therefore the subgroup is included in the risk-adjustment model.
Second, we build the full risk adjustment model in a stepwise manner to examine to what
extent each set of individual characteristics contributes to explaining individual variation in
LTC use. To this end, we estimate a series of four models. We first test the impact of a basic
model based on demographic characteristics on the predicted loss for all subgroups. Next, we
add subgroups based on (i) prior LTC use, and (ii) prior health care expenditures and hospital
admissions to this basic model variables. The full model includes all subgroups that were
identified in the first model. For each risk adjustment model, the remaining predicted loss is
the difference between the observed expenditures for these subgroups and the expenditures
predicted by the risk adjustment model.
Third, for each subgroup that is included in the full model, we assess the impact of includ-
ing this subgroup in the risk adjustment formula on the insurers’ incentives for efficiency—a
commonly used selection criterion (see e.g. Van Kleef and Van Vliet (2010), Van de Ven and
Ellis (2000) and Pope et al. (2000)). Subgroups that are likely to have a negative impact on the
insurers’ incentives for efficiency are those for which conditions of eligibility can be easily
manipulated by insurers and for which it is highly attractive for them to do so. Manipulation
may be financially attractive when the expected benefits exceed the costs, which consist of the
required effort and the cost of the additional treatment that the enrollee is required to receive
to be eligible for the subgroup. Excluding these subgroups from the full model results in an
incentive compatible risk adjustment model. This third step thus sheds light on the tradeoff
between creating incentives for efficiency and incentives for risk selection.
All five models described above are estimated by ordinary least squares regression (OLS)
in order to facilitate interpretation of the results (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000)7. Moreover, all
current Dutch risk adjustment models use OLS, so using OLS increases the comparability
and compatibility with these models.
The POLS sample was very small compared to the population of sickness fund enrollees
and therefore the subgroups based on detailed information about health status, disability and
socio-economic status from the POLS survey are not included in the risk adjustment model.
Instead these subgroups are used as a benchmark to evaluate the impact of the risk adjustment
model on incentives for risk selection.
Variables
In each of the models, the dependent variable measures public LTC expenditures in 2005.
In case the individual dies in 2005, expenditures are annualized by dividing expenditures
by the share of the year the individual was alive. The data set provides information on the
quantity of LTC that was provided in kind, which was 95 % of the publicly financed LTC
in the Netherlands in 20068 (CVZ 2011). The quantities provided, i.e. days institutionalized
or hours of home care, are multiplied by the maximum prices as set by the government in
order to calculate expenditures; co-payments are not taken into account. The data contains
information about institutional care use in 2004 and 2005 and about all use of six types of
7 Other commonly used specifications did not provide a strictly better fit than OLS. Results for the other
specifications are available from the corresponding author.
8 The remaining 5 % consisted of cash transfers, which are not in the dataset.
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home care in 2004. For 2005, the data contained information about use of only four out of
six types of home care9.
The set of subgroups that make up the basic model are based on three demographic charac-
teristics: age, gender and co-residence, i.e. whether someone lived in a single-person house-
hold. Age and gender are the backbone of any risk-adjustment model, while co-residence
proxies informal care availability. Informal care availability is an element of the eligibility
assessment procedure for homecare (CIZ 2005) and formal LTC use is known to be correlated
with informal LTC use (Bonsang 2009; Van Houtven and Norton 2004).
The subgroups of LTC users are based on prior LTC use rather than expenditures because
using prior LTC use as a risk adjuster rewards insurers for negotiating lower prices with
providers. Subgroups are created for each type of home care and each type of institutional
care separately. Each of the subgroups of home care users consists of individuals who used
this specific type of home care at least 1 hour per week on average. In selecting subgroups of
institutional care users, we aim at balancing responsiveness to changes in LTC use against
incentives for overreporting and oversupply resulting from the (partial) reimbursement of
additional expenditures in the future. Therefore, for each of the four types of institutional
care, four subgroups are generated consisting of individuals who stayed in an LTC institution
for ≥1 day, 91–180 days, 181–365 days, and the entire year (366 days), respectively. These
subgroups reflect differences in expected future expenditures between long-term and short-
term residents: future expenditures are positively correlated with the number of days that
the individual is institutionalized. Furthermore, following Van Barneveld et al. (1997), two
subgroups are created consisting of patients who received home care and institutional care,
respectively, on the last day of 2004, which shows the size of the predictable loss for enrollees
who only use a very small amount of LTC in the prior year.
We also include subgroups based on prior HCE. Each of these subgroups measures health
care expenditures10 that are associated with LTC use: expenditures on hospital and outpatient
care, prescription drugs, paramedical care, transportation, and durable medical equipment.
For each of these categories, three subgroups are constructed that consist of persons who are
among the 15 % who had the highest expenditures during the last year (omitted for hospital
and outpatient expenditures), during each of the last 3 years, and during each of the last 5
years. Because the data only includes HCE covered by sickness funds, we also include a
variable indicating which persons were not insured through a sickness fund in one of the 4
years preceding 2004. If someone was no longer registered with a sickness fund during a
year, e.g. because of losing his/her eligibility status due to exceeding the income threshold,
and hence is not in the data set for the entire year, expenditures are annualized.
In addition to the subgroups based on prior HCE, we also create subgroups based on
hospital admissions because information on hospitalization and diagnosis information may
help to predict LTC use (Wong et al. 2010). Subgroups are based on 94 diagnoses (based on
a grouping algorithm of ICD-9 codes, see Polder et al. 2002) and on 48 types of treatments
(based on ICD-9-CM volume 3 codes) using hospital admission data from 2002–2004. In
addition, we create 12 Diagnostic Cost Groups (DCGs). DCGs are used for risk adjustment in
the Dutch health insurance scheme and consist of clinically homogenous inpatient diagnoses
for chronic health problems that have similar future HCE (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000).
9 These four categories include domestic care I—cleaning, domestic care II—cleaning and help with orga-
nizing the household, personal care and nursing. Information on assistance and support is not available for
2005.
10 As for LTC, risk adjustment based on health care use rather than expenditures would reward insurers for
negotiating lower prices but data on health care use was not available, except for the data needed to construct
Diagnostic Cost Groups.
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Using the ICD-code of the main diagnosis and the medical specialty that set this diagnosis,
each individual is assigned to either the reference group (DCG 0)—people with no hospital
admission or an incidental admission (e.g. fractures)—or the highest DCG they are eligible
for (Rijksoverheid 2005; Prinsze and van Vliet 2007)11. We include the DCGs but not the
separate subgroups based on diagnoses and treatments in the risk adjustment model because
the subgroups based on diagnosis and treatments and the DCGs overlap. Furthermore, the
impact of the DCGs on the incentives for efficiency is known to be limited in the context
of health insurance (Lamers 1998) while including all subgroups separately will increase
incentives for oversupply and over-reporting.
As the administrative data do not provide detailed information on personal characteris-
tics, subgroups based on health, disability and socio-economic characteristics could only be
created using the smaller set of respondents that completed the POLS survey. Although it is
much smaller and persons in nursing homes are not sampled, this survey allows investigat-
ing incentives for insurers to use such questionnaires for risk selection purposes. The same
subgroups are used as in De Meijer et al. (2011), who study determinants of LTC expendi-
tures among the elderly, and in Stam and van de Ven (2008), who identify subgroups that
generate losses for health insurers. Of these subgroups, only those are selected for which the
predicted loss deviates significantly from zero in the absence of risk adjustment. Because
the average predicted profit without risk adjustment for the POLS sample and the subsample
answering the health module are positive, the predictions for these samples are adjusted by
subtracting the mean deviation from zero for the relevant sample multiplied by the ratio of
the individual’s observed expenditures to the sample mean observed expenditures in order to
ensure that the average predicted profit was zero for this subsample.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 and Table 1 show that the distribution of LTC expenditures is highly skewed. The
median is at 4,598 euro; 2 out of 3 LTC users spend less than 10,000 euro. Furthermore,
there are two spikes, one at 32,000 euro (a full year of care in a residential home) and one
at approximately 91,000 euro (a full year of care in a nursing home). The average cost per
LTC user (15,677 euro) is much higher than the average cost per user of medical care (about
2000 euro in 2004). Furthermore, LTC expenditures are strongly correlated with prior use
of LTC: average LTC expenditures in 2005 are higher for home care users in 2004 than for
non-users and highest for nursing home residents in 2004 (Table 1).
Analysis
The regression analysis reveals that the included covariates explain a large share of the
variation in aggregate expenditures of LTC use in 2005: the R2-statistics are generally higher
11 The assigned DCG does not match with the actual DCG for some individuals because of two limitations of
the data set: 1. not all hospitals reported information on patients to the national medical registry; 2.information
on two relevant ‘side treatments’, dialysis and artificial respiration at home was not available at all. As a
consequence, DCG 13 (dialysis) is empty and the reference category consists of DCG0, DCG13 and patients
who needed artificial respiration and should therefore be in DCG12. Furthermore, information on radiotherapy
and chemotherapy was not specific enough to ensure that no patients who do not belong in the related DCG
are excluded.
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Fig. 1 Distribution of LTC expenditures in 2005 of LTC users in 2005
Table 1 Descriptive statistics population
Mean SD
LTC expenditures in 2005 1, 159.18 7, 564.05
LTC expenditures in 2005 conditional on any use 15, 677.04 23, 370.78
LTC expenditures in 2005 if no LTC was received in 2004 93.62 1, 657.39
LTC expenditures in 2005 if received home care in 2004 9, 673.22 18, 333.23
LTC expenditures in 2005 if stayed in a residential care facility in2004 31, 767.09 15, 902.13
LTC expenditures in 2005 if stayed in a nursing home in 2004 61, 451.47 35, 674.80
than those obtained in similar studies on medical care and mental health care (see e.g. Van
de Ven and Ellis 2000)12. Most of the explanatory power derives from the demographic
variables and prior LTC use. The model that only includes demographics has an R2 of 0.23.
Including prior LTC use increases the R2-statistic to 0.73, while variables related to prior
HCE contribute only marginally to the overall goodness of fit, regardless of whether prior
LTC use is included. A Copas test (Copas 1983) did not detect overfitting and therefore we do
not need to split the sample in two. Nearly all coefficients are significant in each of the models
and show the expected sign. The DCGs sometimes violate the monotonicity requirement:
being assigned to a higher DCG with a more severe diagnosis does not in all cases lead to
a higher capitation payment. This is undesirable as it generates disincentives for providing
more care in cases in which more care might be desirable. The most prominent example is
DCG 4, which includes diagnoses related to a cardiovascular accident; myocardial infarct;
and angina pectoris among other things, and which has the third largest coefficient. These
results highlight that the relationship between prior hospital stays and LTC expenditures is
different from the relationship between prior hospital stays and HCE, on the basis of which
these DCGs were constructed.
12 Table 3 in the appendix contains descriptive statistics and all regression results.
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No risk adjustment model
In case of annual contracts with community rated premiums but no risk adjustment, the
predicted losses would be very large for subgroups based on prior LTC use or based on prior
health care expenditures (Table 2)13. These predicted losses, together with the large size of
most of these subgroups (last column), signal that incentives for risk selection against these
subgroups would be huge. Other results (available upon request) show that some diagnoses
are indicators of a persistent loss: for four diagnoses that yield a large predicted loss in the
next year, the predicted loss is still larger than 1,000 euro 2 years later and 3 years later.
Demographic model
The results for the Demographic Model, which adjusts subsidies for the age, gender and
co-residence status of the enrollee, show that including demographic characteristics in the
risk adjustment model does not sufficiently reduce the predicted losses for subgroups based
on prior LTC use and prior HCE (Table 2). Therefore, it seems imperative to include the latter
subgroups in the risk adjustment model to reduce incentives for risk selection.
Prior LTC model
Including variables on prior LTC use as risk adjusters by definition reduces the predicted
losses on these subgroups to zero. But risk adjustment based on prior LTC use not only
reduces predicted losses for prior LTC users but also for many subgroups based on prior
HCE and for several subgroups of individuals who were hospitalized for diagnoses that were
associated with the highest predicted loss without risk-adjustment (Table 2). This finding
implies that it is no longer attractive for insurers to select against any of these groups of
patients. For some other subgroups based on prior health care use and on HCE, however,
including variables on prior LTC use as risk adjusters does not substantially reduce the
predicted losses. Therefore, insurers have an incentive to detect and avoid these subgroups,
which are not included in the risk adjustment formula and which are expected to generate a
loss to the insurer.
Prior HCE and DCG model
Subsequently, we examine the effect of adding information on prior health care use and HCE
patterns in the risk adjustment formula on the predicted losses. The predicted losses for the
subgroups of insured that used LTC in 2004 all remain above the threshold of 1,000 euro when
DCGs are added to the model, along with variables indicating high expenditures (top 15 %)
on hospital and outpatient care for the last three and the last five years, and high expenditures
on prescription drugs, transport, and durable medical equipment for the last year, the last
3 and the last 5 years (Table 2). But while these variables only have a small impact on the
predicted loss for subgroups of LTC users, including HCE is important for reducing the
13 Tables 4–7 in the Appendix contain the predicted losses for all the subgroups that were included in the final
model, 20 subgroups based on diagnosis from information on hospital admissions in 2004 and subgroups that
were based on the POLS survey data; results for other subgroups are available from the corresponding author.
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predicted loss for subgroups based on prior hospital admissions for several diagnoses, e.g.
heart failure, and asthma and COPD. So while for some diagnoses prior LTC use is more
important in reducing the predicted loss, for other diagnoses prior HCE and DCGs causes
the largest drop in the predicted losses.
Full model
When all information is combined in the full risk adjustment model, the predicted losses
are substantially reduced for many of the subgroups we distinguished. For example, this full
model reduces predicted losses sufficiently for all but seventeen diagnoses and for all but
one type of treatment. Yet, including information on prior HCE and the variables on LTC
use also leads to predicted profits larger than 1,000 euro for three diagnoses: hip fracture,
chronic ulcers of skin including decubitus (Table 2) and other lower extremity fracture (not
in Table 2).
The initial predicted losses also vanish for the subgroups based on self-reported disability,
health and socio-economic status when prior LTC use and prior HCE are included in the
risk adjustment formula. Although the loss is still larger than 1,000 euro for persons who
are unable able to perform at least one ADL, it is no longer significantly different from zero
(Table 2).
Incentive compatible model
All subgroups based on prior LTC use and listed in Table 2 are large and generate a large
predicted loss in the absence of risk adjustment. Yet, some of these subgroups are expected
to give insurers perverse incentives because inclusion of enrollees in these subgroups is
financially attractive and can be easily manipulated. For example, the required additional
spending for admitting a person for a single day in a nursing home (about 190 euro—
see Table 3 in Appendix) is much lower than the subsequent increase in the risk-adjusted
capitation payment of 11,299 euro for the subgroup of people who are admitted to a nursing
home for 1–90 days. Table 3 in Appendix shows that when an individual uses LTC during
a given year, in the next year the insurer would be compensated for most of the loss if risk
adjustment were based on prior LTC utilization.
The trade-off between incentives for efficiency and incentives for risk selection is also
relevant for some subgroups based on prior HCE and health care use. For some subgroups,
the inclusion criteria are set at low levels because very few individuals use these services,
e.g. individuals with high expenditures on transportation or medical equipment. As a result,
for these groups the minimum amount of expenditures is lower than the increase in the
risk adjustment payment. Therefore, the subgroups based on only high expenditures in the
previous year are omitted in the incentive compatible model. For DCGs and subgroups with
high HCE in successive years the incentive problem is expected to be limited (Van de Ven
and Ellis 2000).
Leaving subgroups that were expected to compromise insurers’ incentives for efficiency
out of the incentive compatible model has a small effect on the overall predictive power of
the model: the incentive compatible model has an R2-statistic of 0.70, compared to 0.73 for
the full model. A comparison of the results of the full model and the incentive compatible
model at the subgroups level reveals that removing these risk adjusters does not only affect
the predicted losses for the subgroups that are no longer included but also the predicted losses
for subgroups based on hospital diagnoses and treatments and for the subgroups based on
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detailed survey information on health and disability. Yet, the impact on the predicted losses
for these other subgroups is often fairly limited. Therefore, further reduction of the number
of subgroups in the risk adjustment model may be considered.
Conclusion and discussion
In the Netherlands and several other countries, public LTC insurance is offered by non-
competing agents that are not at risk for providing coverage. This situation is suboptimal
because it provides these agents with little or no incentive for efficiency and cost containment.
In the Netherlands, the government proposed to incentivize insurers to increase efficiency
and innovation of LTC provision by putting them at risk for providing LTC coverage and
allowing them to compete for customers and thus let them reap the benefits of improvements
in quality and reduced expenditures. Introducing financial risk would be easy but might lead
to socially undesired outcomes in terms of equity and efficiency.
To maintain universal access in a competitive LTC insurance market, an adequate sys-
tem of risk-adjusted premium subsidies is imperative. Without adequate risk adjustment
insurers face strong incentives to deter subgroups that generate predictable losses, e.g. by
excluding relevant benefits from the benefit package or by lowering the service level or
the quality of the contracted provider network that they offer to these subgroups (Cao and
McGuire 2003). We have investigated the scope for risk selection and the feasibility of a
LTC risk adjustment formula that sufficiently reduces insurers’ financial incentives for risk
selection14. The attractiveness of managed competition vis-à-vis alternative ways to organize
LTC insurance depends inter alia on the ability to prevent risk selection15. Little is known,
however about the feasibility of adequate risk adjustment for LTC. Hence, improved knowl-
edge about the extent to which risk adjustment can successfully reduce insurers’ incentives
for risk selection helps us to better evaluate the feasibility of managed competition in LTC
insurance16.
Our findings demonstrate that a model that is only based on demographic characteristics
performs poorly: subgroups that may be identified based on their prior LTC use, prior HCE
or other individual characteristics are predicted to generate large losses to the insurer in case
of annual contracts with community rated premiums. This means that in this case, insurers
will face very strong financial incentives to discourage these subgroups from joining their
plan.
Subsequently, we investigated the impact of (1) including individual-level information on
prior health care and LTC use and (2) excluding risk adjusters that compromise insurers’
incentives for efficiency. Not surprisingly, prior use of LTC services is the best available
predictor of future LTC use and its inclusion substantially reduces incentives for risk selection.
The main drawback of this risk adjuster is that it simultaneously reduces incentives for
14 An alternative solution to the problems caused by risk selection would be to deny LTC users to switch
from one insurer to another, yet this alternative would substantially reduce the insurer’s incentives to act as
prudent buyers of LTC for this group and would increase their incentives to keep out future LTC users if risk
adjustment is inadequate.
15 In addition to the incentives for efficiency and for meeting consumer preferences that managed competition
may create for insurers, it may also affect overall efficiency by facilitating innovation through trial-and-error
by insurers.
16 Risk adjustment may not only be used to equalize insurer payments and their expected costs but also in the
context of capitated and bundled provider payments.
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efficiency. This problem may at least partially be overcome by (i) including indicators for
having used LTC for multiple years because it may be harder for insurers to manipulate use
and expenditures for multiple subsequent years than for just one year17 and (ii) by optimizing
the DCGs for predicting LTC expenditures18.
An important finding is that in addition to prior LTC use, prior HCE and inpatient diagnosis
and treatment information also prove to be vital: predicted losses persist for certain categories
of HCE and for some inpatient diagnoses that occur mostly among the frail elderly even when
prior LTC use is taken into account. These diagnoses probably indicate a negative health shock
that leads to increased formal LTC use. However, including all available risk adjusters in the
model does not fully eliminate the potential for risk selection. While the predicted losses
disappear for health, disability and socio-economic characteristics that can be obtained from
a survey, risk selection on the basis of some inpatient diagnoses and treatments as well as prior
LTC use remains feasible. An insurer can easily identify most of these subgroups, e.g. the
subgroup of patients who received short-term institutional LTC, were admitted to a hospital
for a hip fracture, dementia-related problems or asthma or COPD, or who had high HCE in
2004 but not in 2003 or 2002. Yet, including these variables in the risk adjustment formula
is not an option, as it would give insurers an incentive to overprovide these types of health
care.
Ideally, risk adjustment is based on data on individuals’ underlying needs for care but
such information is rarely included in administrative data and insurers’ LTC claims data.
As a consequence, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, risk adjustment in LTC will have to
rely on prior utilization and expenditure data, which is likely to not only reduce incentives
for risk selection but also incentives for efficiency. Most of all, our findings highlight the
interrelatedness of elderly care, medical care and social care. This implies that, in order to
prevent risk selection, any risk adjustment formula needs to take into account the potential
simultaneous or subsequent use of these other types of care. Therefore, our findings also have
implications for the reverse relationship: taking into account prior LTC use should also be
considered and studied for optimizing risk adjustment in health insurance.
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Appendix
See appendix Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
17 Risk adjustment based on multiple years of use may be more useful for home care than for institutional
care because of the limited average length of stay at a care facility.
18 In addition, incentives for risk selection may be reduced by including more subgroups, e.g. based on
socio-economic status and more specific information on prior use of durable medical equipment that indicates
disability (see e.g. Van Kleef and Van Vliet 2010), as risk adjusters.
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